After the 2002 airline mergers in China, no significant airfare increases were found to have occurred in a sample of markets served by China Eastern and China Southern. In most of the markets that were directly affected by the mergers, airfares in fact declined. This is somewhat surprising, especially given the absence of antitrust laws and enforcement over the period subsequent to the mergers. Our results, however, do show that market power was possibly exercised after the mergers in China Eastern's hub-to-hub markets.
Introduction
On 11 October 2002 China's nine airlines merged into three airline groups: the Air China Group, the China Eastern Group and the China Southern Group. The Air China Group was a consolidation of Air China (based in Beijing), China Southwest Airlines (Chengdu) and CNAC.
1 The China Southern Group was formed from China Southern Airlines (Guangzhou), China Northern Airlines (Shenyang) and China Xinjiang Airlines (Urumqi). The China Eastern Group included China Eastern Airlines (Shanghai), China Yunnan Airlines (Kunming) and China Northwest Airlines (Xi'an).
These airline mergers have resulted in a reduction in the number of competitors, changed concentration on routes or at airports, increased multimarket contact, enhanced networks and possibly improved service quality, and induced new competitive strategies. Potential market power and potential efficiency gains have been associated with these changes. Airfare variations reflect one or more of these changes, but it is not easy to identify to what extent each of these changes has contributed to airfare changes because of the difficulty in measuring these changes and quantifying their effects. In the absence of other significant events that could have affected the airlines' pricing, we can assume with some confidence that airfare changes observed after the end of 2002 were most likely due to changes arising from the 2002 mergers.
Market power has been a prime concern of consumers and antitrust authorities. Several case studies have focused on mergers in the US airline industry following the merger waves of the 1980s, including GAO (1988) , Borenstein (1990) , Werden et al. (1991) , and Kim and Singal (1993) . The absence of airline mergers during the 1990s has resulted in few new empirical studies, even after the wave of airline mergers in the late part of the decade.
Many articles concerning China's airline mergers have appeared in newspaper and airline industry magazines. No published study has as yet systematically investigated the effects and policy implications of these mergers. These mergers have conferred on China's big three airlines a joint dominant status in domestic Chinese markets. There was no clear-cut antitrust law and no effective antitrust authority during the period of the mergers. Given that China's airline industry has a long tradition of engaging in price fixing, and the difficulty of achieving efficiencies in the short run, it could have been predicted that the airlines would likely continue this practice after the mergers. A study of these issues should inform the development of an effective competition policy in China with respect to airline markets.
This paper will examine changes in the airfares charged by China Eastern and China
Southern after 2002 in a sample of their markets. Whenever possible we will seek to infer whether market power has been exercised and/or whether efficiency gains were realised in these markets. Market power may exist not only in the markets that are directly affected by the mergers, but also in markets that do not experience any obvious effects from the mergers.
For example, the enhanced dominant status of a carrier at an airport resulting from a merger may influence airfares in all of the markets out of this airport, including any -unaffected‖ routes. It is therefore suggested that merger effects studies should look at both the -affected‖ markets and the -unaffected‖ markets.
In this paper, the effects of the Chinese airline mergers on airfares will be examined by considering the following questions: 2
How have fares changed on average in the sample markets following the mergers?

How have fares changed on hub-to-hub markets within an airline group?
How have fares changed out of the airline groups' major hubs ( Shanghai and
Guangzhou)?
How have fares changed in market groups with different market structures?
Section Two will briefly describe the history of China Eastern and China Southern. Section
Three will present the data and some key variables associated with the mergers. Section Four will discuss the methodology used to answer our questions of interest, and Section Five will answer these questions. Section Six will conclude.
Profiles of China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines
China Eastern Airlines
China Eastern Airlines was one of the six trunk airlines that separated from the former Southern were simultaneously present.
In this study the average revenue yield, or the price per kilometre, is used to examine pricing trends. The revenue yield is obtained by dividing the average airfare charged by a carrier on a given route by the route distance.
An overview of China Eastern (MU) and China Southern (CZ) in 2002-2004
It would be expected that the merger activities would change the structure of the airline industry. A simple count of the average number of airlines operating on China Eastern's and China Southern's sample routes is reported in Figure 1 . The average number of airlines present on each route for both airlines has fallen since the mergers. Generally, China
Eastern's sample routes had more competitors than China Southern's routes, which is not surprising given that Shanghai is the biggest commercial city in China, and routes to and from Shanghai should have attracted more carriers. As mentioned previously, there are 21 identical markets in the two airlines' samples, that is, both airlines were present in them. Figure 3 shows the average number of passengers carried by China Eastern and China Southern in these markets. On average, China Eastern had a much lower share in terms of the passengers carried per city-pair market before the mergers, and the takeover of China Yunnan and China Northwest appears to have given it the opportunity to catch up. One reason might be that China Eastern's competitiveness has been strengthened through acquiring these two airlines, at least in these 21 markets. As a result, Figure 4 shows that the average load factors of the two airlines in 2003 and 2004 were almost identical. Airline sales managers have done everything possible to achieve a load level not less than a rival's, as this is a key criterion in assessing the performance of a marketing team in China's airline industry. it is our understanding that any difference of more than 10 per cent in load factors on the same route operated by any two airlines would cause an unavoidable price war to break out, because price competition is the only effective means that airlines with lower load factors can use to achieve a similar load factor to that of rival airlines.
Airfare comparison methodology
To attribute observed airfare changes to mergers, a relative fare is usually employed to compare the treatment group (the sample routes) with the control group (routes with similar distances that are not affected by the mergers) (see Kim and Singal 1993 and Singal 1996). 7 However, in China's 2002 airline consolidations, a comparable group or control group is not easy to establish because of the small number of unaffected routes. Given the sweeping consolidations involving all the major airlines that have extensive networks across China, most of the routes in our sample have seen changes in the airlines flying these routes. This has left very few comparable markets from which to construct an effective control group.
Even though there are some markets where the number of competitors and the carrier presence have been the same in both the pre-and post-merger periods, it is believed that the new airline groups would be likely to follow a different pricing strategy in these markets after the mergers. Notably, according to the mutual forbearance hypothesis (Edwards 1955) , the effect of the changed multimarket contacts resulting from the airline mergers could change the pricing patterns in the markets where the mergers did not occur. Therefore, it is difficult to find a group of markets to serve as a meaningful control group.
However, the use of the same subjects (here, the airline markets) without a control group to compare airfares during the periods before and after the merger is appropriate if this can be justified by strong evidence that the two-period data sets are comparable, and if we believe that fare changes in the same markets were mainly caused by merger activities (Meyer 1995) .
The preliminary discussion period for China's airline mergers commenced in 2001 and ended on 11 October 2002, when the new conglomerates were formed. During this period, the would-be merging parties were still competing. Because the impact of a policy change is almost never instantaneous but requires time to be implemented, and also for reason of convenience, we will take 1 January 2003 as the date from which the actual mergers commenced and a certain degree of coordination was initiated. Before then, the merging parties are assumed to be competing with each other. This study is a short-run analysis over three years. It is believed that most costs were kept stable, given that the fleets had been upgraded by the end of the 1990s by switching from Russian-made aircraft to Boeing and Airbus models. The only possibly significant shock to this industry might have been the rise in fuel prices from the second half of 2004, but most airlines would have suffered only from early 2005, and so this rise in oil prices should not pose a serious problem for this study. Clearly, it should be acknowledged that we cannot attribute all the fare changes observed during this period to the mergers. However, once inflation has been controlled for, it seems that the average yields in the three periods should still be comparable even without a control group. 9 It is most likely that a great part of the variation in fares from one period to another can be associated with the merger activities. Scheme was to set a price floor to prohibit destructive competition, as in many markets airlines had already discounted coach fares up to 70 per cent before the Scheme was announced. After the promulgation of the Scheme, airlines still priced with little reference to the lower limit. Therefore, the announcement of this Reform Scheme had virtually no significant effects on the airlines' pricing (see Zhang and Round 2008) . When studying the merger or the market concentration effects, this policy change will not be taken into account.
Having justified the appropriate comparison method, the ANOVA technique, extending the paired t-test to more than two points in time, will be used to compare the means of the yields of the same group of markets in each of the three years. In the absence of any impact from other major events following the mergers, a significant price rise thus is likely to indicate increased market power and a significant decrease in price is likely to provide the evidence that efficiencies emerged from the mergers. However, it should be noted that efficiency would have been hard to achieve immediately after the mergers, especially in the semiintegration stage of 2003. If we see a significant fall in prices in 2003, it would not be sensible to interpret it as the result of efficiency gains. Rather, it could be possible that competition was stronger than before even with a reduction in the number of competitors, which means that the airlines could have competed with no reference to their cost, bearing the loss in some markets in the short run, especially when the newly merged firms sought to grow their market shares and establish a market presence. This is not uncommon, even in a concentrated airline market where competition is still strong. This might be particularly the case for state-owned firms that may have multiple objectives apart from the goal of profit maximization. As most major Chinese airlines were only partly privatised at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, some of the ideologies and goals of a stateowned firm still probably existed in them to some extent. At times, the airlines' behaviour has not conformed to that of a goal of profit-maximisation.
However, after privatisation, there has likely been a shift towards the goal of pursuing maximum profits, given the pressure coming from shareholders. Therefore, we believe that the profit-maximisation assumption still holds in the long run. As a result, if we see a decrease in airfares in 2004, the close-to-full integration stage, the most likely explanation would be that the efficiency effect dominated the market power effect, and we could conclude that the market power effect outweighed the efficiency effect if we observe a significant increase in prices in 2004.
Results and analysis
5.1. How have fares changed on average in China Eastern's and China Southern's sample markets?
The yield means adjusted for inflation for China Eastern's and China Southern's sample markets for each year are presented in Table 2 A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA test was conducted with the dependent variable being the yields in China Eastern's sample markets, and the factor (otherwise called the independent variable) being the time period. The result for the within-subject effects test displays a significant time effect, indicating that yields were significantly affected by the independent variable (year periods), proxies for the influences of the pre-merger period It is evident from these comparisons that neither airline seriously abused any market power they might have developed following the mergers. Although we do not have any evidence to claim that efficiency gains were achieved across the board following the mergers, and that these led to the decrease in prices, these results clearly show that the outcomes from the mergers (which occurred without any antitrust monitoring) have not been realised at the expense of reducing consumer welfare in general, at least over this period, in terms of the airfares charged. However, this is an observation that applies only across the whole sample of markets. It is possible that market power could have been exerted in individual markets. We turn now to examine some of them.
How have fares changed on hub-to-hub markets within an airline group?
We define a hub airport of an airline group as an airport where this group has set up a branch or a subsidiary company, deployed planes and occupied airport facilities. We refer to the airport where an airline is headquartered as its primary hub, and the rest as secondary hubs. A market linking an airline's hubs (including primary hub or secondary hub) is thus defined as a hub-to-hub market. The two airlines' hub-to-hub markets are listed in Table 3, together with their average market share each year in these markets. Markets on the same route but in opposite direction (for example, Shanghai-Nanchang and Nanchang-Shanghai) are treated as separate markets because air pricing is directional.
12 Table 4 Table 4 shows that in China Eastern's non-hub-to-hub markets, yield means kept falling over the period and the falls were statistically significant, in contrast to the results from the hub-to-hub markets. China Eastern presumably charged lower prices in these markets either because of efficiency gains, or because of stronger competition. Table 4 also shows that hub-to-hub markets exhibited much higher yield means than nonhub-to-hub markets in every time period. However, in this paper, we have sought to evaluate the effects of the airline mergers based on the reasonable assumption that the mergers and the subsequent integration were the only cause that led to the changes in airfares over time, with no specific intention of considering whether the hub-to-hub markets might exhibit higher prices than non-hub-to-hub markets. The higher yields could be because of market power being exercised in the hub-to-hub markets, or may simply reflect higher demand or higher costs in these markets. It is not wise to rely on such a simple comparison between hub-to-hub 12 It should be noted that the airlines acquired by China Eastern (China Yunnan and China Northwest) were based in Kunming and Xi'an, respectively. Owing to the unavailability of data to and from these two hubs, Table 3 therefore mainly comprises the markets that had been China Eastern's hub-to-hub markets before the mergers, and contains no hub-to-hub markets resulting from the mergers except for the Taiyuan-Kunming market. This is a shortcoming in the data.
markets and non-hub-to-hub markets without controlling for other factors that clearly made a contribution to the determination of airfare levels.
We now focus on the hub-to-hub markets of China Southern. These include markets to and from Shenyang and Urumqi, where the acquired airlines, China Northern and China Xinjiang, were based. China Southern dominated most of these markets, especially after the merger (see Table 3 ). Interestingly, the yield means in China Southern's hub-to-hub markets (see in the non-hub-to-hub markets were not significantly different at the 5 per cent significance level, so it can be said that the means were roughly the same during the three years. 14 This is in contrast to China Eastern's pricing behaviour.
How have fares changed in the markets departing from the airline's primary hubs?
There is no doubt that China Eastern had substantial influence in determining the airfares before and after the mergers at its primary hub, Shanghai, through its extensive sales channels, advertisements, and the resultant local reputation that it had established in the two decades prior to the mergers. This was also true for China Southern at its primary hub,
Guangzhou. Mergers may have enforced the dominant status of the airlines in their primary
airports, but at the same time, the simultaneous mergers also increased the ability of the airlines to challenge each other's dominant status. So it is hard to predict the actual effects of the mergers on airfares out of these two cities. However, the ability to fix prices in these 13 As we only retain three decimal places, cities should have been enhanced after the mergers in these two cities due to the reduction in the number of parties with whom such agreements had to be negotiated. Although China Eastern and China Southern possessed the highest airport shares in Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively, Table 1 shows that their shares never exceeded 54 per cent. This indicates there has always been a strong presence of at least one other airline in these two airports. As a result, unilateral effects would seem to be less likely and coordinated effects seem to be more possible. In the absence of the ability to raise prices unilaterally, it could have been expected that it was in China Eastern's and China Southern's interests to keep fares as stable as possible through collusion in the markets out of Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. These changes were statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, for its markets not flying out of Shanghai (including those flying to Shanghai), the yield means decreased steadily and significantly each year. China Eastern seems to have enjoyed the ability to keep airfares steady in markets from Shanghai, and at levels little lower than they were before the mergers occurred, but this ability appears not to have been present after the merger in its markets that did not involve departures from Shanghai. It is likely that it faced fewer constraints in pricing in its headquarters city. In fact, it was not an uncommon practice for the airlines to collude for the flights out of Shanghai in the years before and after the mergers. Our findings here reflect this fact. Table 6 indicate that these changes were not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
This suggests that mergers and the subsequent integrations did not have an obvious impact on China Southern's fares. Its ability to charge higher prices appeared to be neither enhanced nor weakened at Guangzhou. However, it still exercised a certain degree of influence on prices in the markets from Guangzhou by keeping prices relatively stable, as was the case in Shanghai for China Eastern. In contrast, Table 6 shows that the yield means from the markets that did not depart from Guangzhou decreased each year, the decrease from 2003 to 2004 being statistically significant, indicating that efficiency gains dominated in the close-to-full integration period. Similar to China Eastern, it shows a weaker ability for China Southern to charge higher prices after the mergers in the markets that did not depart from its primary hubbing airport.
How have fares changed in markets with different market structures?
We partitioned the sample markets of each airline into six market groups according to various structural characteristics of the markets before and after the mergers, and considered how fares changed in each group. The definition of each group and the number of markets for each category is reported in Table 7 . We plot the yield means of the different market structures in all three years in Figure 5 for China Eastern and in Figure 6 for China Southern.
In Figure 5 , the six lines are not parallel, indicating different trends following the merger in the different market categories. Yields in the monopoly markets (category 1) are higher than those of most other categories, except in 2004 when monopoly route yields fell substantially, one possible reason being that the threat of potential entry by other airlines had increased. As there is only one market where the merger led to monopoly, shown by the line plot as category 2, the result might not be representative and we will not discuss it further. In the markets where the China Eastern mergers occurred, but at least one other rival remained If we believe that efficiency was hard to achieve in 2003 immediately after the merger, this can only be explained by the fact that there existed market power before the merger, and stronger competition after the mergers pushed fares down. In fact, most of the major rivals in this type of market were ones that were later acquired by China Southern and Air China.
China Southern or Air China were also present in their own right but on relatively small scales. After the takeovers, China Eastern faced a stronger China Southern or Air China, leading to lower fares immediately after the mergers. It is surprising that category 6 with its relatively low fares could still attract new entrants after the mergers, but this entry led to a (not significant). Possibly these markets were routes thought to be potentially profitable in the future, which the airlines sought to cultivate. In these markets, China Eastern's airfares might have been more influenced by the new entry than by the merger activities, making it difficult to assess efficiency effects, but clearly market power has been restrained in these markets.
For China Southern, Figure 6 shows that markets in category 1 were associated with slight yield rises in 2003 and 2004 . Even though the change in each year was not statistically significant, this suggests that China Southern did not face any threat from potential entrants in these monopoly markets. Category 2, in which routes that were a duopoly became a monopoly, exhibited lower yields each year. Unlike the case of China Eastern, yields did not always decrease immediately after the mergers. Rather, in categories 3, 4 and 5 they rose slightly in the second year but not significantly, except for category 3, and decreased significantly in the third year. This is consistent with our expectations that efficiencies would not be achieved until some time after the mergers. No obvious market power could be perceived in each market group over the whole period. Category 6 exhibits a pattern that is quite similar to that for China Eastern, suggesting a declining trend due to new entry.
It is worth pointing out that there were no 
Conclusions
We need to emphasise that our attention has been restricted to assessing fare changes resulting from the mergers within the same groups (types) of markets, without comparing 15 Our results for the different market groups might have been different if we had controlled for the effect of tourist routes. Prices on these routes should be looked at separately in future studies in order to make more precise inferences about the effects of market power. However, given the small number of tourist routes in our sample markets, it is unlikely that considering their effect would have changed our conclusion. 16 The SARS shock in 2003 had a negative impact on demand, but it was obvious that during this period airfares were much higher than in any other periods. Almost all airlines charged full normal fares because of the low and inelastic demand resulting from the fact that all individuals and businesses cancelled their unnecessary travel, and there was no hope of increasing demand with lower prices. That is to say, without SARS, the average fares between different types of markets. We also acknowledge the limitation of the methodology used to compare airfares before and after the mergers without being able to control for all the other possible influential factors. However, some useful conclusions on the effects of the mergers can still be drawn using this simple methodology. Overall, it appears that the Chinese airline consolidations did not result in any apparent harm to consumers, at least for the first two years after the event. This is somewhat surprising, especially given the lack of antitrust laws and oversight at this time.
We suspect that what happened was the emergence for the first time in China of three strong airline groups who each were desperate to gain market share to create strong market positions, and who needed strong loads and good cash flows to help provide a firm financial foundation for further expansion, both in China and into overseas markets. 
